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Abstract  
 
The Mexican National Payment for Ecosystem Services (PES) programs, which provide 
financial incentives for rural landholders to conserve forest, were originally designed under the 
logic of market-based conservation. Based on a multi-sited, multi-scalar ethnography of the 
Mexican national PES programs, this article examines the process through which a national rural 
social movement was able to redefine the market-based narrative of PES, the historical and 
political context that provided this window of opportunity, and the ways in which their 
engagement led to a hybridization of the policy itself. The involvement of the rural social 
movement introduced a very different conception of PES – as a recognition by Mexico’s federal 
state and urban society of the value of campesino environmental stewardship and an economic 
support to allow them to remain on the land. Their direct involvement in the redesign of the 
programs had a significant impact on their conformation that reflected this vision of revaluing 
the rural: the inclusion of agroforests and sustainably managed timber lands; requirements for 
self-defined forest management plans; provision of dedicated funding for technical assistance; 
and the training of local extensionists. I believe that in mapping the evolution of the Mexican 
national PES program we can begin to see how, in this particular place and time, rural social 
movements employed PES as a "useful surface of engagement" (Escobar 1999, p. 13) for 
contesting the market-based notions of the federal state, international lending institutions and 
conservation NGOs. I position this analysis in the context of the global project of “grabbing 
green” and as an example of the frictions that can inhibit and even partially reverse the logic of 
the seemingly inexorable rise of market-based conservation policy and projects.    
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La Disputa sobre la Conservación Basado en el Mercado:  
Los Pagos por Servicios Ambientales como Superficie de 
Articulación para los Movimientos Sociales Rurales en México 
 
 
Resumen: 
 
Los programas nacional de México para los pagos por servicios ambientales (PSA), que proveen 
incentivos financieros a propietarios rurales conservar su bosque, fue diseñado en base a un 
modelo de conservación basado en el mercado. Basado en una etnografía del programa 
Mexicano de PSA en mútiples sitios y a multiples escalas, este artículo examina el proceso a 
través del cual un movimiento social rural pudo redefinir la narrativa de mercado del PSA, el 
contexto histórico y político que facilitó este cambio, y las formas en que la participación del 
movimiento dio lugar a una hibridación de la política de PSA. La participación de este 
movimiento social rural introdujo una concepción distinta al PSA: como un reconocimiento por 
parte del gobierno federal de México y la sociedad urbano del valor del manejo sostentable de 
los campesinos y el soporte económico necesario para permitir que los campesinos se queden 
en sus territorios. La participación directa de los miembros del movimiento en la reformulación 
de los programas PSA tuvo un impacto significativo en su diseño en formas que reflejo su visión 
de “revalorar el campo”: la inclusión de los sistemas agroforestales y los bosques bajo manejo 
activo para producción de madera, la definición autónoma de los planes de manejo forestal, la 
asignación de fondos específicos para asistencia técnica y la capcitación de profesionales 
‘extensionistas’ locales. Al mapear la evolución de los programas Mexicano de PSA, se puede 
notar cómo, en este lugar y en este momento particular, los movimientos sociales rurales 
utilizaron al PSA como una “superficie útil de articulación” (Escobar 1999: 33) para 
disputar la supremacía de políticas ambientales basados en mercados como fue promovidos por 
el gobierno federal, los bancos multilaterales de desarrollo y las organizaciones no 
gubernamentales de conservación. Este análisis debe ser realizado en el contexto del 
proyecto global de ‘saqueo verde’ y como ejemplo de las fricciones que pueden inhibir, e incluso 
revertir parcialmente, la lógica del aparentemente inevitable ascenso de la conservación basado 
en el mercado. 
 
Palabras claves:  
pro-mercado, pol.tica ambiental, pago por servicios ambientales, movimientos sociales rurales, 
México, Latinoamérica.
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Introduction 
 
On January 31, 2003, over 100,000 campesinos converged on the central plaza in Mexico City, 
the heart of the federal government and the nexus for social protest in that country, with numbers 
and directed purpose not seen since the agrarian reform movement of the 1930s (Carlsen 2003). 
A coalition of twelve peasant and indigenous organizations, ¡Movimiento el Campo no Aguanta 
Más! (MECNAM), translated as “The Countryside Can’t Stand Anymore!” had coalesced in 
response to the continued impacts of the neoliberal agriculatural policies of the 1990s on rural 
communities. They gathered that day to demand the renegotiation of the agricultural chapter of 
NAFTA and to force the Mexican state to, “Acknowledge the fundamental cultural role of 
agriculture and to break with the ideology that ‘development’ means to empty the countryside of 
farmers” (UNORCA 2007). 
After a series of increasingly dramatic protests and prolonged negotiations, the 
government of then president, Vicente Fox, agreed to form MECNAM-headed working groups 
to discuss which rural policies would be addressed and how. The leaders of the environmental 
working group focused much of their efforts on pushing for the reform and expansion of a newly 
implemented federal Payments for Hydrological Services program that provided rural 
landholders in zones of water scarcity financial incentives for forest conservation. The end 
product of these negotiations the Acuerdo Nacional para el Campo (National Agreement for the 
Countryside), codified a number of groundbreaking concessions, including an agreement to form 
a second national PES initiative and to allow MECNAM representatives to serve on the design 
committee.  
At face value, it seems strange that a rural social movement dedicated to combating what 
they themselves defined as “neoliberal policies” would so thoroughly embrace a market-based 
conservation program that proposed to privatize and commoditize the functions of rural 
ecosystems. However, the MECNAM representatives brought to the new program’s design 
committee a very different conception of PES – as a recognition by Mexico’s federal state and 
urban society of the valuable role of campesino environmental stewardship and an economic 
support to allow these stewards to remain on the land. The direct involvement of MECNAM in 
the design of the new PSA-CABSA program had a significant impact on its conformation that 
reflected this vision of revaluing the rural: the inclusion of agroforests and sustainably managed 
timber lands; requirements for self-defined forest management plans; provision of dedicated 
funding for technical assistance; and the training of local extensionists. However, perhaps the 
most profound impact of MECNAM’s involvement in program design was in altering the policy 
makers’ understanding of PES. They introduced a profoundly distinct vision of the inevitable 
connection between the production of “nature” and the cultural reproduction of its rural stewards 
that was in direct opposition to the market-based logic which constructs nature is divisible into 
autonomous economic units that can be assigned a monetary value, sold and traded. In doing so, 
these rural social movements directly contested the neoclassical economic theories that are the 
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foundation of PES, shifting the policy discourse that positions these payments as market-based 
financial incentives given to rational actors who would otherwise deforest toward a vision and 
practice of PES as societal compensation for the forest stewardship of campesinos. 
 This study is based on a multi-sited ethnography of the Mexican national PES programs. 
Methods included extensive interviews in Mexico and the United States with the actors primarily 
responsible for designing and implementing the Mexican PES program (N=73), semi-structured 
interviews with project participants in 32 rural communities in the Mexican states of Jalisco, 
Colima, Guerrero and Oaxaca (N=102), discursive analysis of project-related documents, 
summary statistical analysis of national demographic and geographic databases, and observation 
of national and international policy meetings. Fieldwork was begun in October of 2005 and is 
ongoing. 
 This article examines the process through which a rural social movement in Mexico was 
able to redefine the market-based narrative of PES, the historical and political context that 
provided them a window of opportunity in which to engage a national PES policy, and the ways 
in which this engagement led to a hybridization of the policy itself. I position this analysis in 
context of the global project of “grabbing green”, the focus of this special issue, as an example of 
the ‘frictions’ that can inhibit and even partially reverse the logic of the seemingly inexorable 
rise of market-based conservation policy and projects.    
 
Market-Based Conservation as a Useful Surface of Engagement 
 
In contesting the market-based logic of PES, MECNAM employed rich narratives grounded in 
the specific imaginaries of rural Mexico: references to campesinos as children of ever-sustaining 
maize, the power that results from mestizaje (racial and cultural mixing) that is part of Mexican 
national identity, and the undying ethos of the Mexican Revolution. However, it is important to 
recognize and situate these narratives in the context of broader discourses on the role of peasants 
in environmental stewardship that had been and continue to be generated by national and 
international rural social movements. .  
The early 1990s saw a global rise in regional, national and transnational rural social 
movements. The reasons posited for this expansion include the harsh repercussions of the 
neoliberal agricultural policies first implemented in the 1980s, the openings presented by the 
transition to democracy in many developing countries, and the decline of the more traditional 
forms of political representation such as unions and political parties (Escobar & Alvarez 1992; 
Deere &Royce 2009).  Latin American rural social movements are some of the largest and most 
active in the world, from national-level organizations such as the Movement of Rural Landless 
Workers (MST) in Brazil to regional organizations such as the Latin American Coordinator of 
Rural Organizations (CLOC) and the transnational La Vía Campesina (Wolford 2007; Wolford 
2008; Baletti et al. 2008; Deere &Royce 2009; Borras 2012). These movements are highly 
networked and share many common dialogues, including critiques of neoliberal policies in 
Shapiro-Garza, Elizabeth. 2013. Contesting Market-Based Conservation: Payments for Ecosystem Services as 
a Surface of Engagement for Rural Social Movements in Mexico, Human Geography 6(1), p 134-150 
 
 
 5 
agriculture, a commitment to social justice, and the promotion of an alternative vision of 
development that encompasses sustainable development, agrarian reform and food sovereignty 
(Deere & Royce 2009; Borras 2012). McMichael (2006) has characterized the “global agrarian 
resistance” as challenging the dominant framing of “development” in four ways: 
 
“First, it inverts the current development explanandum, focusing attention on 
poverty as an outcome of, rather than a point of departure for, development 
(neoliberal style). Second, and related, it challenges the development telos of de-
peasantization, revalorizing rural cultural-ecology as a global good. Third, it 
subverts the subjective focus of development on individual responsibility by 
reasserting a political culture of solidarity. And fourth, it practises a multi-
perspectival politics, challenging the single-point perspective of the official 
development narrative.” (p 472) 
 
The environmental narratives employed by MECNAM were themselves a combination of 
home grown, place specific representations of rural reality and constructions that incorporated or 
built upon the narratives of these broader social movements. The international network of rural 
social movements has often contested what they view as a perverse and misguided focus on the 
intrinsic value of “nature” with no recognition of the intrinsic web of human construction or 
sustenance, others have found ways to appropriate these narratives to better fit the constraints 
and rural realities of the global south. As one example, Martinez-Alier (1995) found that, "There 
is at first sight a great distance between local movements and global issues. However, if we look 
a the defense of agricultural biodiversity…we notice an interesting phenomena: the use of global 
environmental ideas for local fights." (p. 88). 
A number of scholars of Mexican rural social movements have theorized about the 
instrumental work such environmental narratives can accomplish, “against forces that seek to 
wrench [the campesino community] and the indigenous community, from whatever control of 
natural resources that they still hold – land, in the first place, but also biodiversity, forests, water, 
energy production and other raw materials” (Pickard 2004, p. 3). In his discussion of what he 
terms “ecological neo-Zapatismo”, Victor Toledo (2006) reflects on the fact that the Zapatistas 
and other indigenous and rural movements have adopted the language of “sustainability”, but 
that in doing so they are, “projecting beyond its most common meaning,” (p. 3) to a concept that 
is encompassing of the necessity of human intervention to maintain the health and productivity 
of “nature”. Mexican scholar, Enrique Leff (1998), is more explicit in his explanation of the 
basic utility involved in rural social movements taking on environmental rhetoric, claiming that, 
“The displacement of traditional human rights for [a rhetoric of] environmental rights… [allows 
them to discuss] the rights to self-manage their conditions of existence, which implies a process 
of reappropriation of nature as a basis for their survival and condition to generate an endogenous 
and self-determined process of development.” (Leff 1998, p. 70).  
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I believe that in mapping the evolution of the Mexican national PES program we can 
begin to see how, in this particular place and time, rural social movements employed PES as a 
"useful surface of engagement" (Escobar 1999, p. 13), as a site of contestation with the federal 
state, international lending institutions and conservation NGOs. My research documents the 
processes through which social movements in Mexico adopted and effectively ‘hybridized’ PES 
as a rhetorical and conceptual tool to capture at least some of the “value”, fictitious, imaginary or 
otherwise, produced through the national PES programs.  
 
The Mexican National Payment for Ecosystem Services Programs 
 
Part of the larger global trend toward market-based environmental policies and programs (See 
the introduction to this special issue), payments for ecosystem services provide financial 
incentives to land owners to alter management practices in ways that increase the provision of  
functions of ecosystems that are directly beneficial to humans. The ecosystem services most 
commonly associated with PES initiatives are hydrological services, such as water purification 
and increased filtration into the water table or mitigation of flooding, biodiversity conservation, 
scenic beauty and green house gas sequestration. Although most PES initiatives are “market-
like” in that participation is voluntary, they provide incentives for conservation vs. penalties for 
degradation and contracts stipulate that payments are conditional on the conservation or 
improvement of the targeted ecosystem, few actual “markets” for ecosystem services have 
emerged, with most programs starting and remaining as subsidy programs by state or national 
governments or as part of larger projects of international conservation organizations (Wunder 
2007). 
Mexico’s federal PES programs are the largest of only four other national-level PES 
initiatives in the world: Costa Rica’s national PES program, China’s Sloping Land Conversion 
Program, and the Conservation Reserve Program in the United States (Sanchez Azofeifa et al. 
2007; Bennett 2008; Alix-Garcia et al 2012). Though their configuration has morphed over time, 
in their first years of implementation the Mexican programs were comprised of two federally 
funded branches: the Payment for Ecosystem Services–Hydrological (PSA-H) and the Program 
for the Development of Markets for the Ecosystem Services of Carbon Sequestration, the 
Derivatives of Biodiversity, and to Promote the Introduction and Improvement of Agroforestry 
Systems (PSA-CABSA). Both programs are administered by the Mexican National Forestry 
Commission (CONAFOR). Between 2003 and 2011, approximately 3.2 million hectares of 
forested land were entered into the programs and more than US$489 million in Mexican federal 
funds were distributed to 5,967 communal or smallholder private property participants  
(CONAFOR 2012). 
The first iteration of the national PES initiative, the PSA-H program first implemented in 
2003, was strongly influenced by the discourse of international conservation NGOs and 
multilateral lending institutions that promoted market-based environmental policies a more 
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efficient and effective than previous command and control regulatory approaches (McAfee & 
Shapiro 2010). The initial proposal for a national level PES program Mexico’s Strategic Forestry 
Program 2025, a product of a 2000-2001 collaborative planning group made up of actors from 
the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB), the Finnish government and the Mexican 
Secretariat for the Environment and Natural Resources (SEMARNAT) (CONAFOR 2002). The 
proposal notes that Mexico’s diverse and extensive forests offer enormous potential for carbon 
sequestration and a “comparative advantage” for biodiversity prospecting given the diversity and 
extent of its forests. However, this formative document, anchored by the conceptualization of 
PES as a market-based conservation solution, makes little mention of likely socioeconomic 
effects. 
The design of the first PES program was led by a group of economists and is clearly 
based on neoclassical economic principles. The initial design team was made up of members of 
the Department of Policy and Environmental Economics at the National Institute of Ecology 
(INE), a federal environmental research agency, and economists from the Mexican Universidad 
Iberoamerican and Centro de Estudios y Docenia Económica and from the University of 
California, Berkeley, with the World Bank involved in an advisory capacity (Alix-Garcia 2005). 
The Bank’s Mexican office also formed an advisory committee of academics and representatives 
from environmental NGOs, foundations, and municipal officials with PES experience, but the 
committee had little direct impact on policy formation (Muñoz-Piña 2008).  
The final design of PSA-H policy was a mix of market-based environmental measures, 
strongly imposed federal control, and both conservation and poverty-alleviation criteria (McAfee 
& Shapiro 2010. It is very clear that the original designer’s intention was for the program to 
serve as “start-up funding” for landholders who would, after the 5 year program contract ended, 
find way to sell the ecosystem services of their conserved forest on open markets (McAfee & 
Shapiro 2010). To further these ends, they established two selection criteria intended to ensure 
demand and target the program to areas with the greatest potential for the formation of actual 
markets for hydrological services: 1) location upstream from a population center > 5,000; 2) 
location in recharge zones of overexploited watersheds. 
Payment rates, which the design team had proposed be established based on the average 
opportunity cost of forest conversion to corn production, were instead, rather arbitrarily, based 
on the size of the budget. They were set at US$36.40 per hectare/year for cloud forest because of 
their supposed superiority at producing “hydrological services”, and US$27.30 per hectare/year 
for other forest types. Five-year program contracts were signed with forest land owners, with 
annual payments made contingent upon verification through remote sensing analysis or site visits 
that no forest cover had been lost in the enrolled property. Lands managed for timber or 
agroforestry (crops grown under the shade of trees) were not allowed and the program contracts 
required that landowners take a “no-touch” approach to their forests, limiting all access and use 
of forest resources. As will be discussed in more detail below, this rather simplistic approach to 
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both conservation and poverty alleviation was to be challenged with rural social movements 
fought their way onto the design committee of a second national PES program, PSA-CABSA. 
Thus far, funding for the PES programs has come almost entirely from the Mexican 
federal government, albeit with an infusion of a US$45 million loan from the World Bank and a 
US$15 million grant from the Global Environment Facility (GEF) in 2007 that were meant to 
foster the development of true markets for the ecosystem services produced. Markets for the 
ecosystem services produced by program participants have largely failed to materialize and the 
program has for all intents and purposes become yet another federal rural subsidy program (for a 
more detailed analysis of the causes of this “market failure” see Shapiro-Garza Forthcoming). 
 
Rural Social Movements in Mexico 
 
As was mentioned earlier, the assault on the market-based principles of the original national PES 
program was lead by a coalition of rural social movements that coalesced as MECNAM in 2003. 
In this section I explore the history of rural social movements in Mexico and discuss the 
convergence of economic crisis and political opening that lead MECNAM to organize and 
provided the opportunity, unheard of the history of agrarian mobilization in that country, of 
directly negotiating the terms of a federal level rural policy. Seizing this opening, MECNAM 
was able to insert their own vision of “conservation” and “poverty alleviation” into the policy 
design of the second PES program and into the hearts and minds of the policy makers. 
From 1929 to 2000, Mexican politics were dominated at all levels by the corporatist rule 
of the Partido Revolutionario Institutional (PRI – Institutionalized Revolutionary Party).  This 
dominance translated into pervasive, authoritarian clientelism, “the manipulative interplay of 
persuasion and coercion” (Hellman 1994, p. 127). In rural areas this clientelism meant vote 
buying, funneling of rural social services and aid through local PRI power brokers referred to as 
caciques, incorporation of social groups into state-controlled “movements”, and active and brutal 
repression of any political opposition or non-state sponsored collective action (Fox 1994; 
Hellman 1994; La Botz 1995). In the 1980s, shaken by the economic crisis of 1982 and the loss 
of faith occasioned by the poor state response to the 1985 earthquake in the capital of Mexico 
City, the dominance of the PRI began to be slowly but successfully challenged both by reformers 
from within and social activists from without (Fox 1994; Preston & Dillon 2004). This period 
marked the rise of a strong network of civil society organizations and independent social and 
environmental movements in Mexico. 
This corporatist dominance of the PRI party at all levels of Mexican politics led to a 
continual, primarily covert suppression of social activism. As their name, the Institutionalized 
Revolutionary Party, implies, PRI leaders were masters at “institutionalizing” political collective 
action. Unions, cooperatives, and political organizations were allowed to form, but only with the 
sanction and very close supervision of the PRI party. Rebellious groups who spurned the 
clientelism of the PRI system were often violently repressed (Hellman 1994; Fox 2007). The PRI 
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party’s dominance of civil society did wax and wane to some extent throughout the term of their 
rule, but it also evolved and became more sophisticated as the years passed.  Hellman (2008) 
describes a particularly “nasty twist” of president Echeverría, who ruled in the name of the PRI 
from 1970-1976, as being, “the invention of peasant and workers' organizations that carried the 
names of existing militant peasant organizations but which were headed by people passionately 
loyal to Echeverría." (p. 69). The PRI-sanctioned organization of rural workers and peasants is 
called the Confederación Nacional Campesina (CNC - National Peasant’s Confederation) 
(Hardy-Raskovan 1984; MacKinlay 1996). Athough it no longer entirely dominates rural politics 
in Mexico, the CNC still holds enough control among segments of the rural population that the 
Fox administration was able to use the organization to, on some issues and occasions, divide and 
conquer the MECNAM coalition (Fox 2007, p. 344). 
The PRI began to lose its political stranglehold in the mid-1980s as the process of 
democratization and the growth of a relatively independent civil society developed. As the 
avenues for open political protest and active engagement of civil society organizations became 
available, the campesinos of México have devised various forms of resistance to the decreasing 
state support for small-scale, peasant production and the devaluation of their way of life brought 
about by structural adjustment policies and the aftermath of other neoliberal policy interventions 
such as NAFTA. A number of organized campesino movements were formed in the late 1980s 
and early 1990s, from organized armed rebellion in Chiapas and other southern states (Collier & 
Lowery Quaratiello 1994), to the resurgence of rural labor unions (MacKinlay 1996), to the 
organization of farmers’ commodity cooperatives representing production as diverse as corn and 
coffee (Acuña Rodarte 2003; Aranda Bezaury 2003). These rural social movements have 
attempted to fill the gaps left by the withdrawal of state by replacing direct state price supports 
and services with cooperatives, state credit agencies with credit unions such as that of the El 
Barzón alliance, and corporatist membership organizations such as the CNC with more radical, 
independent associations of rural producers. Some of the most successful of these autonomous 
campesino organizations include the National Marketing Association of Rural Production 
(ANEC) and the National Union of Autonomous Regional Peasant Organizations (UNORCA), 
not to mention one of the most militant and influential of these movements, the Zapatista Army 
of National Liberation (EZLN) in the southern state of Chiapas.  
As mentioned above, rural social movements in Mexico have become adept at 
appropriating environmental and social-liberal rhetoric (Bray 1997; Stolle-McAllister 2005; 
Harvey 2005). A discursive construct commonly employed by campesino organizations in 
Mexico and throughout Latin America is that of revalorización del campo (revaluing the rural), a 
call for political leaders to recognize the environmental, cultural and economic benefits provided 
to society through traditional rural stewardship and the integral, co-production of “nature”. These 
movements have employed the concept of revaloración to counter the dominant narrative that 
has pervaded Mexican politics since the 1980’s; that “development” must mean the 
industrialization of agricultural production and the movement of peasants into urban areas, their 
labor being more efficiently allocated to industrial production or the service sector.  As Mexican 
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and Central American campesino organizations proclaimed in the 2004 Manifiesto de 
Xochimilco, “You will not conserve nature by depopulating the countryside… To restore lost 
resources and equilibrium, what is missing is the restoration of a sustainable rural economy, 
capable of use without destruction.” (CMDMIRP 2004, Point 12). This narrative, which attempts 
to make explicit the “value” of campesino environmental stewardship, was to dovetail nicely 
with the conceptual construct of PES as rural social movements rhetorically transformed the 
motive for these payments from an incentive to bribe potential environmental degraders into a 
financial recognition of value of and support for keeping peasant stewards on their land.   
 
Hybridization of the PES Programs by Rural Social Movements  
 
As I mentioned in the introduction, the MECNAM coalition of rural social movements and 
organizations that coalesced in 2003 in coincidental conjunction with the implementation of the 
first of the national PES programs, was to have a have specific and significant impacts on the 
both the conformation of the policy and the ontological rationale of the policy makers. 
UNORCA, a coalition of campesino organizations that first formed in the mid-1980s, was 
primarily responsible for motivating the wider union of campesino organizations into the 
MECNAM coalition starting in the year 2000 (UNORCA 2007). When the first national PES 
program, PSA-H, was introduced in 2003, MECNAM was just gaining enough critical mass to 
begin to make overarching demands of the federal government (Rubio 2007). Although not all 
MECNAM leaders agreed that the movement should embrace PES, the reform and expansion of 
the PSA-H program was to become the cornerstone of the movement’s environmental agenda.  
Some members of the MECNAM coalition, including UNORCA, originally denounced 
the national PES program, equating these market-based mechanisms with other “neoliberal” 
policies that could only disempower the rural poor. However, some of the organizations that 
were initially wary of PES were later integrally involved in promoting the program and the 
concept. UNORCA had been amongst a number of the MECNAM constituent organizations that 
had, in the month before the 2003 protests in Mexico City, led a protest against market-based 
conservation measures being implemented in the Lacandon region of the state of Chiapas, calling 
bioprospecting agreements, ecotourism and the commercialization of non-timber forest products, 
“A new form of plundering the lands and resources of indigenous communities by private 
interests and transnational companies.” (UNORCA 2002). And yet one of UNORCA’s leaders 
agreed to serve on the PSA-CABSA design committee, and by the time of the organization’s 
national level meetings in 2009, “environmental services providers” were counted among their 
2,792, “regional and grass-root” constituent organizations (UNORCA 2009). It is important to 
recognize that this apparent change of heart by UNORCA and other MECNAM organizations 
may not signal a complete acceptance of PES, but more a means of  capturing the, “perhaps 
scarce but not unimportant monetary resources that circulate in the rural economy.”   
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(Lindemann 2006, p. 55) while still maintaining relative autonomy from the influence of the 
federal state.  
As mentioned in the introduction, after a series of MECNAM-led large and dramatic 
street protests at the beginning of 2003, the administration of President Vicente Fox agreed to 
negotiations in which all federal rural policies would be reviewed by MECNAM working 
groups. Although not granted the power to change policies, these groups would be spaces in 
which movement representatives could negotiate directly with state agencies. Because the 
Ministry of Finance had officially designated the new PES program as a rural subsidy, it too was 
open for review (Alix-Garcia 2005). The MECNAM Environment and Rural Development 
working group developed a report based on their negotiations that listed six basic, “proposals for 
valuing the environmental functions of campesino agriculture.” (Marielle & Aguilar 2003, p. 1). 
Proposal number one called on the Mexican state to, “revalue the multiple environmental, social, 
economic, and cultural functions that campesinos carry out as guardians of our natural 
resources.” (Ibid, p. 2). The report claimed that rural poverty and emigration was weakening the 
ability of campesino families and communities to continue to steward the country’s natural 
resources, and argued that, in order to ensure that this traditional stewardship continued, the state 
should revalue campesino labor in a way that was, “not just words and promises, but which 
establishes mechanisms of economic compensation.” (Ibid, p. 2).  Not surprisingly, one of the 
primary policy foci of the working group was the expansion and reform of the recently 
implemented federal PSA-H program. The reforms that they advocated for included restricting 
the number of private landholder participants and instead targeting economically marginalized 
ejidos and indigenous communities, raising per hectare payments, and including productive 
forest ecosystems such as sustainably managed timber and shade grown coffee (Alix-Garcia 
2005). MECNAM continued their protests and direct negotiations and, after some bureaucratic 
and political resistance, US$9 million in federal funding was set aside for a second PES program 
the total allocated to the PSA-H program. 
In April of 2003, then President Fox signed the Acuerdo Nacional para el Campo 
(National Agreement for the Countryside), that codifying the agreements reaches with the 
MECNAM-affiliated working groups (Diario Oficial de la Federación 2003). Though 
CONAFOR initially resisted, a committee was formed to design the second PES program. The 
committee was made up of six representatives from MECNAM’s civil society organizations as 
well as members from CONAFOR, the original PSA-H design team, and two government 
ministries. As one of the MECNAM representatives said, this committee, “was supposed to be a 
dialogue that combined the experience of government agencies and civil society organizations to 
create a program with real impact.” (Interview June 16, 2006).  
A number of the federal policy makers who were forced to negotiate the terms of the 
second PES program have admitted that they at first perceived the MECNAM representatives as 
mercenaries intent on hijacking an environmental incentives program to alter it to yet another 
federal rural subsidy for their constituencies. The MECNAM representatives I interviewed 
admitted that they did see the potential for PES program funding to fill some of the holes left 
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after the withdrawal of rural production subsidies, technical assistance and price supports the 
resulted from NAFTA and the multiple rounds of structural adjustment initiatives in the 1980s 
and 90s (Marielle & Aguilar 2003). However, these leaders also viewed their positions on the 
design committee as a chance to alter both the narrative and the policy practices surrounding 
PES in Mexico as well as contributing to a larger project to “revalue the rural” by framing PES 
as a recognition by the federal state and society write large for campesino’s contributions to 
environmental stewardship. As one MECNAM leader expressed it, PES is: 
 
“A new type of relation within a country and between countries. It is not just about 
sales and monetary gains, it is new a form of relationship: between the city and the 
countryside; industries and campesinos; developed countries and undeveloped 
countries; regions that are producers of waste and those that are producers of 
oxygen.” (Interview November 22, 2005) 
 
This vision of PES, not as an opportunity to introduce market-efficiency into conservation, but as 
a renewed recognition of the essential relationship between the traditional rural and the 
industrialized urban, is strikingly distinct from that of the original PSA-H program design team 
and it was to have very specific repercussions in the policy design of the second PES program.  
The design committee for the new PES program included representatives from 
CONAFOR, INE, SEMARNAT, the National Water Commission (CNA), two coffee producer 
associations (CNOC and CEPCO) two community forestry organizations, Mexican Network of 
Peasant Forestry Organizations (Red-MOCAF) and the National Union of Community Forestry 
Organizations (UNOFOC -), a recently created coalition of organizations implementing PES 
programs in the state of Oaxaca (SAO), and UNORCA the previously mentioned national 
network representing campesino and indigenous organizations..  
There had been an early and persistent political focus at the federal level on employing the 
PES program, at least rhetorically, as means to address rural poverty. The link between PES and 
poverty alleviation, as conceived by the program’s original designer and the executive branch 
that was to become one if its greatest champions, is very direct. According to this view of PES, 
contracts are signed with poor rural land holders to abandon any use or management of their 
forest.  The infusion of cash reduces poverty and the change of land use practices conserves 
forests, which in turn produces ecosystem services. This simplistic approach fails to take into 
account the complex, multi-faceted and interlinked causes and solutions of both poverty and 
environmental degradation. 
The representatives from MECNAM introduced subtler conceptualizations of both 
“conservation” and “poverty alleviation” into the dialogue of the PSA-CABSA design committee 
that were to have substantial impacts on the policy itself. This understanding of inextricable web 
of relationship between the ecological and social systems of rural Mexico was articulated in an 
evaluation of the PSA-H program published by a national level research NGO linked with 
community-based forestry issues and initiatives and to which a number of MECNAM leaders are 
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connected,  the Mexican Sustainable Forestry Advisory Committee (CCMSS).  The report states 
that, the PSA-H program promotes “rent-seeking” behavior in participants because it, “Does not 
require clearly defined actions and responsibilities in relation to forest management.” (Merino-
Pérez et al. 2004 p. 5). As a MECNAM representative on the PSA-CABSA committee member 
stated, “The PSA-H program did not have a great impact on the communities where they were 
implemented because there was no requirement that they actively manage [the forest in the 
program], only that they not touch it.” (Interview June 16, 2006). The CCMSS report warns that 
lack of requirements for active forest management makes enrolled forest, “Even more vulnerable 
than those that are managed for commercial production,” and that the no-touch provisions could, 
over a long period, “Contribute to the process of abandonment of the forest and the people who 
live in forested regions.” (Merino-Pérez et al. 2004, p. 6). 
MECNAM representatives brought to the PSA-CABSA negotiations table this view that 
“management” of forest ecosystems for the production of both ecosystem services and rural 
“poverty alleviation” is not antithetical to the conservation of forests and the ecosystem services 
they produce, but is in fact necessary to achieve either. This clashing of two distinct 
conceptualizations of the meaning and means of PES translated into a number of specific policy 
recommendations introduced by the MECNAM representatives and adopted into the PSA-
CABSA rules of operation: requirements that participants develop active forest management 
plans, provision of designated funding for technical assistance to develop the plan and provide 
training in sustainable management practices, and the inclusion of highly managed agroforestry 
systems as eligible for forest conservation funding. 
The representatives of the MECNAM recognized that rural communities face enormous 
financial and knowledge barriers in quantifying, monitoring and managing for environmental 
services and in creating or negotiating with existing market for the services produced. They also 
worried that the direct payment approach, with the annual payments from CONAFOR being 
deposited directly into the community treasurer’s account with no stipulations as to how the 
funding would be spent, would do little to promote true and lasting community development. As 
the CCMSS report concludes, “Compensation with the PSA-H program is limited to economic 
payments, with no consideration of other types of compensation that various service users could 
support, such as: access to training and technical assistance, preferential markets, certification, 
etc.” (Merino-Pérez et al. 2004, p. 9). The MECNAM members argued for and won specific 
funding for technical assistance for development of management plans and for training of local 
extensionists. While these may seem like small changes, they represent an attempt to turn the 
simplistic notions of poverty alleviation first proposed by the designers of the PSA-H program 
and later supported by Mexico’s president into self-defined, meaningful and long lasting rural 
development. 
The process of combining these two very distinct approaches and perspectives into 
hybridized whole was a long and contentious process: more than thirty meetings were held 
before the new PES program’s rules of operation were finalized in 2004. After the first year, 
funding for the program was halved every year from 2004 through 2006. Though CONAFOR 
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claimed that these cuts were due to low enrollment rates, it had never throughly promoted the 
program. As one of the MECNAM representatives from the design committee stated when asked 
to interpret this lack of administrative support, he stated that it was, “a form of vengeance on the 
part of the government because the campesino movements forced them to the table and made 
them make concessions.” (Interview, June 29, 2006) 
 In 2006 CONAFOR consolidated PSA-H, PSA-CABSA, and several other programs 
under the rubric of a single program, ProÁrbol, ostensibly to streamline administration. The 
PSA-H and PSA-CABSA oversight committees were disbanded. The new oversight committee 
selected for new ProÁrbol program represented a much less diverse, and subsequently less 
contentious group, with representatives from CONAFOR, SEMARNAT, and the “social, forest 
industry, forest management professional and academic” spheres but, no members from the 
original PSA-H National Institute of Ecology (INE) design team nor from the MECNAM 
coalition (CONAFOR 2006, p 5). However, the Mexican office of the World Bank incorporated 
the disenfranchised MECNAM committee members into a PES policy advisory group, and while 
its members have no voting power in the new PES program, it continues to meet with the 
CONAFOR administrators of the program three times a year and policy changes proposed by the 
group are still being incorporated into the yearly rewrite of the program rules.  
 The MECNAM-led reforms agreed upon in the 2003 National Agreement for the 
Countryside were for the most part weakened or subverted entirely by the administration of then 
president Vicente Fox and the federal agencies it oversaw (Rubio 2007). The PSA-CABSA 
program has been characterized as the exception by many involved. As one of the leaders of the 
MECNAM stated, this PES program was, “one of the few processes in which the federal 
government accepted a multilateral process with campesino and civil society organizations.”  
The same leader also stated that he viewed the involvement of MECNAM in the design process 
for the PSA-CABSA program as having had three more profound impacts on the mentality of the 
policy makers:  “That it was accepted that active management is not antithetical to conservation; 
that the mulitifunctionality of ecosystems was recognized; and that, ultimately, it is not just a 
payment but a true contract.” (Interview, June 29, 2006). 
 While I have detailed above the ways in which participation of MECNAM members in 
the PSA-CABSA design process led to very specific changes to policy, this interaction also 
brought about a certain amount of hybridization of "bureaucratic knowledge" as well (Rocheleau 
2008). In interviews with the CONAFOR administrators on the PSA-CABSA design committee 
it became clear that the involvement of MECNAM’s representatives had had a lasting impact on 
their conception of both the function and functionality of PES.  
In an interview with the national director of the CONAFOR PES programs, he stated that 
his interaction with the MECNAM had radically changed his views about the role of the rural 
poor in environmental degradation. He said, “Before, I thought of ejidos as only resource 
degraders. I learned that often they degrade only because they don’t have resources to invest in 
adequate management.” (Interview Nov. 17, 2006). He also claimed that his interaction with 
MECNAM had changed his view on the very mechanism of PES, that, “You can’t just give out 
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the money and expect that it will cause conservation,” but that active engagement of 
intermediary NGOs at the community level along with funding for technical assistance and 
monitoring are crucial. (Interview Nov. 17, 2006). These changes in perspective by program 
administrators were key in maintaining the innovated policy mechanisms introduced by 
MECNAM after they had left the negotiation table.  
While MECNAM eventually lost its seats on the design committee, the distinct vision of 
PES that they had introduced continued to affect PES policy. When the PSA-CABSA and PSA-
H programs were integrated in 2006, instead of cutting the innovations introduced by MECNAM 
representatives, they were brought into the rules of operation for all PES programs: requirements 
for forest management plans and targeted funding for technical assistance and capacity building. 
Although the portion of the PSA-CABSA program that specifically targeted agroforestry systems 
was cut, in 2010, CONAFOR agreed to allow enrollment into the PSA-H program of a limited 
number of hectares of actively managed agroforestry systems or timber lands in the regrowth 
phase as long as a sustainable harvest management plan was in place.  
Although the MECNAM coalition eventually disintegrated as the result of internal 
conflicts and external pressures, the campesino movement in Mexico remains strong.  In the 
beginning of February 2008, the majority of the member organizations of MECNAM joined 
together along with labor and student organizations on a march to Mexico City’s Zocolo to 
commemorate the MECNAM protests five years earlier. Shouting, “Sin maíz, no hay pais!” 
(Without corn there is no country!), these campesinos again demanded the renegotiation of the 
agricultural chapter of NAFTA and an end to the government’s neoliberal politics. As the one of 
the coalition’s leaders proclaimed, “The imperialists want to burden their own crisis on Mexico’s 
back and it is for this reason that [President] Calderón does everything possible to pass structural 
reforms. But the government forgets that we are an invincible people, that we are the children of 
maize and that we will only die when the sun dies.” (Pérez et al. 2008, p. 2) 
 
Conclusions 
 
While never idealizing campesino land management nor essentializing their role to that of noble 
savages or environmental angels, MECNAM representatives brought to the PSA-CABSA policy 
negotiations a discourse that represented these small holder rural producers as knowledgeable 
and necessary stewards protecting their forest from pests, disease, fire, illegal logging and 
poaching while at the same time relying on these natural systems for their physical sustenance 
and cultural reproduction. These actors also introduced a more holistic definition of “ecosystem 
services” and their necessary co-production with rural communities that was to have profound 
and lasting impacts on the specific design of national PES policies in Mexico and on the 
policymakers themselves. This conceptualization of PES and what it should accomplish was at 
the base of the policy reforms introduced by MECNAM representatives: allowing enrollment of 
highly managed agroforests and timber lands; requiring that participants develop and execute 
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forest management plans; and providing dedicated funds for technical assistance and training of 
local extensionists.  
In engaging with the national PES programs, MECNAM was, on the surface, simply 
playing the age-old political game of bringing federal subsidies home for their struggling rural 
constituents. In fact the battle had much more profound implications for redefining and 
reallocating both the blame and the value produced through PES. While the concessions they 
won in policy design may seem small, they represent a substantial shift away from the standard, 
market-based ontology of PES. In the discourse of PES represented by international 
environmental NGOs and multilateral lending institutions, and reproduced by the designers of 
the original national PSA-H program in Mexico, payments represent a bribe to rational economic 
actors who would otherwise clear cut their forests for more lucrative uses and as a first step in 
the process of separating, dividing, and assigning and economic value to “ecosystem services” 
that can then be bought and traded on the market. In MECNAM’s positioning of campesinos as 
necessary environmental stewards of rural ecosystems and PES payments as compensation for 
the labor and knowledge applied to protecting the forests that produce valuable local, regional 
and global services, MECNAM took one step further in the national and global movement to 
“revalue the rural”. 
Agrawal & Sivaramakrishnan (2000) have applied Foucault’s theories of “biopoltics” to a 
process they refer to as ‘striation’, the desire of the state to partition “the landscape into distinct 
domains of natural existence and productive economic relations.” (p. 2), in an attempt to 
“rationalize the problems presented to governmental practice.” (Foucault 2008, p. 73). But this 
process of disarticulation of natural vs. agrarian landscapes, while still possible (see Osbourne 
2011), has encountered greater obstacles in Mexico than in other countries precisely because so 
much of the agriculturally marginal forestland that would later become of particular interest to 
conservationists was early allocated to peasant and indigenous groups to be held communally. 
Even after the 1992 reform to the constitution that allowed for privatization of communal lands, 
as of 2005 51.6% of Mexico’s total territory and an estimated 80% of the country’s forestland 
was held by núcleos agrarios (Bray et al. 2005; Appendini 2008). The predominant overlap of 
agrarian and "pristine" landscapes in Mexico has led to conservation strategies by both the state 
and environmental NGOs that explicitly recognize the concepts of "wise use" (i.e. community-
based conservation zones, biosphere reserves, etc.). Whereas in other countries the “occupation” 
of state-held protected or “natural” areas by peasants or indigenous groups who are granted some 
degree of access may be the norm, it is rarely recognized with legitimate or full land tenure 
(Ribot & Peluso 2003). MECNAM’s co-option of the PES programs might not have been as 
successful, nor the hybridization of the concept towards a representation as an economic support 
of traditional rural stewardship been so complete, if campesinos’ tenure rights to the land on 
which ecosystem services are being produced did not have such strong historical and legal 
legitimacy. 
In discussing the potential spaces for contestation of contemporary neoliberalism, Porter 
and Craig (2004) claim that, 
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 “Political activism matters, and spectacular street protest has certainly had an 
effect: but the costs of this kind of self-exclusion are specifically what this system 
is designed to raise. The alternative, clearly popular with third sector 
organizations and community groups, is to work ‘included’ within the system… 
to exploit the small openings made by participatory rhetoric and the ongoing need 
for popular legitimation.” (Porter & Craig 2004, p 417).  
 
What becomes apparent from the history of the PSA-CABSA program is that the MECNAM 
members who pushed for a reformed PES program have employed both of these methods with 
some success, finding the program a “useful surface of engagement” (Escobar 1999, p 13) to 
assert the relevance and value of campesino environmental stewardship to the federal state and 
contest the basic premises on which market-based environmentalism is built: the definition of 
nature as separate from its cultural production and its divisibility into economic units that can be 
valued, sold and traded. Instead of choosing radical activism vs. working from the inside, these 
actors used both techniques with some success. It was the “spectacular street protest” and 
resulting negotiations in 2003 that pushed the Fox administration to form the second PES 
program and allow MECNAM representatives on the design committee. That, after two years, 
they were eventually denied voting rights and relegated to a World Bank-led advisory committee 
would seem to suggest that these rural radicals had been pacified with promises of 
“participation” only to be excluded from any position of power or influence.  I would claim, 
however, that this particular “opening” for contestation was not “small”, but that real and 
substantive changes in policy and perception were brought about through their participation. 
Though the MECNAM coalition was eventually to fracture, their representatives on the PSA-
CABSA committee and the organizations and constituencies they represent continue to 
participate in both the radical political activism and to work with and even within the Mexican 
government at various levels. 
Josefina Aranda of the coffee association CEPCO, one of the leaders instrumental in 
putting PES on the agenda of MECNAM, has said, “There are huge contradictions between the 
perspective of the neoliberals who promote [PES] programs from the World Bank, etc., and 
those of us from the Mexican countryside. The fact that we were both interested in developing 
payment for environmental service programs was just a lucky convergence of interest.” 
(Interview November 30, 2005).  What remains to be seen is just how “lucky” this convergence 
of interests will be for the rural communities of Mexico. 
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